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This article looks at one of the more obscure moments in British constitutional history, the 
rise of federal devolution in the United Kingdom in the early 20th century and, in particular, 
the context to the Conference on Devolution that sat between October 1919 and April 1920. 
The conference, as this article will briefly discuss, has been relegated to footnote status in the 
historiography on federal devolution and British politics.  However, while the conference has 
not been the subject of detailed academic attention, the claim that devolution and 
constitutional reform in this period was a by-product of the crisis in Ireland pre-partition has 
gathered considerable traction among political historians.  This article will redress both the 
paltry analysis of the Conference on Devolution within the academic literature and the Irish-
centric historiography on federal devolution in the early 20th century.  On the latter front, this 
article will demonstrate that the conference was the product of forces that extended beyond 
the Irish crisis, in particular parliamentary congestion.  As for the conference itself, this 
article will use a wide range of archival sources to examine critically the conference’s 
deliberations and in doing so will challenge prevailing assumptions regarding the supposedly 
one firm source of agreement during the conference: the powers that the devolved bodies 
should enjoy. 
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On 3 February 1920, a draft of the coalition government’s king’s speech concluded with the 
following words: 
The Report of the Devolution Committee is anxiously awaited and should it prove 
favourable to the idea [of devolution to English, Scottish and Welsh subordinate 
legislatures] immediate steps will be taken to prepare the legislation necessary to give 
effect to its recommendations.1  
Britain appeared a week away from a fundamental shift in her constitutional order.  A polity 
that has traditionally been seen as an archetypal unitary state seemed to be on the verge of 
‘Home Rule all round’ (the north and south of Ireland being dealt with separately with the 
Government of Ireland Bill that was then completing its final stages in parliament). Seven 
days later, however, this commitment had disappeared from the final speech delivered by the 
monarch when he reopened parliament;2 it was never to resurface in any serious way.  
The ‘Devolution Committee’ referenced in the draft speech was the ‘Conference on 
Devolution’ which met 32 times between October 1919 and April 1920.3  Established by the 
UK government following a successful resolution calling for the establishment of a body to 
draw up proposals for subordinate legislatures,4 the conference debated three key questions.5 
First, the question of unit size: would devolution be based on regional or national lines, a 
debate that opened up the question of whether devolution was aimed at resolving existing 
ailments with Britain’s political institutions or whether it was focused around satisfying 
national sentiment. Second, the powers that should be devolved to these legislatures. Third, 
the conference grappled with the dilemma of the composition of the subordinate legislatures 
and their relationship with the imperial parliament. While the conference resolved internal 
differences to agree that devolution would be on national lines, and to agree the powers to be 
devolved to these subordinate national legislatures.  As this article will detail, it was on the 
third question, that the conference ended its work evenly divided.6   
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In the decades since the conference’s proceedings concluded in stalemate, the 
Conference on Devolution has been consigned to the margins of political and constitutional 
history. Indeed, one could almost be forgiven for not knowing that the conference ever 
happened, let alone what its conclusions were. Not only has the conference attracted minimal 
attention within studies of devolution in the United Kingdom,7 it has received a similar 
reception within the cottage industry of British federal studies.8  Even in the volume 
described by Michael Burgess as a ‘masterly account’9 of the conference, Devolution in 
Great Britain,10 only one out of the book’s nine chapters is exclusively focused on the 
Conference on Devolution.11  
2. The Road to the Conference on Devolution: The Limits of an Irish-Centric Historiography 
However, while the Conference on Devolution has been somewhat neglected by the 
literature, the broader subject of federal devolution and territorial governance in the United 
Kingdom in the early 20th century has been dominated by the Irish question.  There has been 
a tendency among certain historians to see the conference, and the flirtation of certain actors 
at the centre with devolution in this era, almost exclusively through the prism of the crisis in 
Ireland, a conceptualisation that, as this article will contend, misses the importance of the 
other dynamics that motivated reformers and sparked these debates. Crucially in doing so, it 
also results in what appears to be a distorted perception of the conference, one in which it 
resembles a straightforwardly monochrome, and arguably predestined, failure.  
At the heart of this Irish-centric historiography are Alvin Jackson, John Kendle and 
George Boyce.  Jackson, for example, dismissed the Conference on Devolution as part of a 
‘lingering diminuendo’ of the ‘federalist assault’ on British politics that had been catalysed 
by the crisis in Ireland.12  Jackson appears to view the failure of federalism, and by 
association the Conference on Devolution, through the prism of Ireland and clearly links the 
collapse of federal devolution debates to the inability of the British state to provide a federal 
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settlement agreeable to Irish nationalist opinion.13  Ireland, as he acknowledges, was simply 
too far gone and among members of the British government, the urgency required to initiate 
reform was, as a result, considerably diminished.14  
Kendle adopts a similar perspective, and while he acknowledges the role of other 
factors in the rise in saliency of devolution in the early 20th century, he is resolute that 
regardless of the role played by concerns of parliamentary congestion, it was ultimately 
Ireland that served to foil both the conference15 and the prospects of devolution more 
broadly:16  
Most of the Unionists became involved because they wanted to find some means of 
keeping Ireland within the United Kingdom. If it had not been for the threat of an 
independent Ireland which they [unionists] believed implicit in home rule, they would 
have happily settled for reforms to Parliamentary procedure in order to resolve 
congestion.17   
Reflecting on devolution’s rise in saliency during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, Boyce similarly concluded that without the Irish question, ‘it is safe to say that 
federalism would hardly have merited serious political discussion in the British Isles; or at 
least would not have moved beyond discussion and into the policy process’.18 However, 
while Ireland was undoubtedly a crucial aspect of the devolution debates in this period, the 
Irish-centric approach of Jackson, Kendle and Boyce risks undermining the role played by 
other dynamics, in particular the role played by parliamentary congestion. As this article will 
demonstrate, this is a significant weakness in the Irish-centric historiography on devolution in 
the early 20th century, not least because parliamentary congestion was at the heart of the 
Conference on Devolution’s raison d’être, as Speaker Lowther himself made clear in his 
memoirs.19  
3. Congestion as a Catalyst: Parliamentary Overload and Federal Devolution 
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While Ireland has been depicted as a dominant actor in the centre’s flirtation with 
constitutional reform in this period, it was not the only catalyst that spurred intellectuals and 
policy makers to contemplate the efficacy of schemes of either pan-Empire, or UK-wide 
federal devolution.  Another significant motivator was the concern that Westminster was too 
overburdened and congested to operate effectively as both an imperial and domestic 
legislature.20  Concerns about parliamentary congestion were aired by a number of politicians 
and political commentators during the 19th century, including Walter Bagehot (who 
described the problems associated with parliamentary congestion as ‘the greatest defect of the 
House of Commons’).21 
These concerns about the ever-increasing congestion of business in parliament 
continued through the late 19th century and into the early 20th,22 and seemed to be a point on 
which politicians from across the Victorian and Edwardian British party system could agree.  
Even Sir Gilbert Campion, who, as will be discussed later, played a crucial role in 
formulating a conservative and intra-parliamentary scheme of devolution during the 
Conference on Devolution, conceded that ‘the steadily increasing pressure of legislative 
business in the House of Commons during the last [century] has made the problem of 
devolution one of first class importance’.23 A subject of greater debate, however, was the 
question of how this congestion could be resolved. 
One of the more immediate attempts to resolve parliamentary congestion was the 
creation of new standing committees within the House of Commons.24  By 1914, six new 
standing committees had been established by the Commons’ authorities as a means of 
rebalancing the parliamentary workload.25  This rise of the committee system, however, was 
not without its critics.  Indeed, a particularly prominent aspect of this opposition was the 
claim that these procedural innovations demeaned the integrity of the House of Commons as 
an institution, not least because these committees required serving MPs to absent themselves 
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from the floor of the chamber while the House was in session.26  Further criticism of an 
extension of the committee system came on the grounds that the existing committee system 
was not only ignored by the government, but often by the MPs who were supposed to attend 
them.27  
 If intra-parliamentary reform was one way in which the British political elite wrestled 
with reducing the workload of parliament, another mooted change was the devolution of 
power to subordinate legislatures. One such advocate was the Conservative intellectual, 
Sidney Low.28 Low’s support for devolution was not based on any strongly-felt desire to see 
national sentiment recognized more clearly in the institutional apparatus of the British state, 
rather he believed that: 
some machinery of subordinate legislatures and executives, some devolution on a 
large and systematic scale would be required in order to relieve the central Parliament 
of burdens beyond its strength.29  
As will be a recurrent theme in this section, Low’s advocacy of devolution was not based on 
a desire radically to restructure the British state; rather it was based on a desire to preserve 
and enhance parliamentary government in the United Kingdom. Indeed, he sought 
subordinate bodies that operated ‘under the reserved sovereignty of a central legislature’.30  
Relief of parliament was, therefore, cast as a means of defending parliament at a time when it 
and other institutions of the British state were ‘overloaded, indeed overwhelmed’ with the 
multitude of domestic and imperial tasks within its jurisdiction.31   
This instrumental conceptualisation of devolution would become particularly 
prevalent among English politicians in the years preceding the Conference on Devolution.32 
Unlike the influence of national sentiment in the support for federal devolution among a 
number of political actors in Scotland and Wales, English political elites, were ‘almost 
exclusively concerned with the question of good government’.33  Focused on ensuring an 
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effective and efficient system of government, English interests in reform were, Sir Reginald 
Coupland argued, hugely influenced by a belief that ‘democracy needed saving from itself’, 
or more specifically, that parliament needed saving from the ‘evils’ of congestion.34  
For Lord Brassey, a leading advocate of devolution in the early 20th century, 
parliamentary congestion was at the forefront of the case for reform. In letters to Lord 
Lansdowne, Sir Edward Carson, Lord Selborne, and Sir Thomas Whittaker, Brassey 
repeatedly stressed the urgency of devolution for good government and order to be secured. 
To Lansdowne, Brassey declared the status quo to be ‘absolutely intolerable’, arguing that of 
the two houses of parliament, it was ‘the House of Commons which needs reforming to 
enable it to transact its business properly’.35  This practical case for reform was further 
outlined in a letter to the earl of Selborne, a leading figure in the imperial federalist 
movement who had become increasingly supportive of constitutional reform by 1914. In this 
letter, Brassey offers an important rebuttal to the Irish-centric historiography of the campaign 
for devolution in his claim that: ‘were there no Irish question at all, devolution in some shape 
or other would be necessary to restore the efficiency of Parliamentary Government’.36  Even 
at the height of the Irish crisis this continued to be his position, as can be seen in a letter sent 
to Carson on 23 January 1918 in which he detailed his fervent belief in the ‘necessity for 
devolution in some shape or other if any form of parliamentary government is to be 
preserved’.37   
These concerns about the pressures on parliament were only intensified as a result of 
the Great War, with the scale of reconstruction required, and the increased size of the Empire 
after the war adding a new urgency to the case for constitutional reform.38  Certainly, as 
correspondence from September 1918 reveals, this concern became an increasingly important 
aspect of the thinking of two of the intellectual ballasts of federal devolution in early-20th-
century Britain, F.S. Oliver and the earl of Selborne.39  Writing to Walter Long on 31 May 
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1918, for example, Selborne argued that devolution had ‘become an absolute necessity’ 
owing to the ‘appalling prospective congestion’ facing parliament following the end of the 
Great War.40  These fears also became prominent features in newspapers sympathetic to the 
federal devolution cause, such as The Times and the Observer.41  For example, a 1918 letter 
to The Times from pro-devolutionist Unionist parliamentarians, including Major Edward 
Wood,42 urged the adoption of federal devolution, not only as ‘the one road only’ out of the 
current impasse in Ireland, but also as a means of resolving what they described as ‘the most 
dangerous congestion’ of parliament since the war.43  
Furthermore, these were worries that formed a central part of devolutionist lobbying 
campaigns within the cabinet, as can be seen from a memorandum drafted by Austen 
Chamberlain for the cabinet in June 1918.44 For Chamberlain, parliament was simply unable 
to cope with the scale of social and industrial problems that would emerge from the war, 
issues he described as being of the ‘first magnitude’.45 These were issues that threatened to 
overwhelm both parliament and executive, particularly when one considers the additional 
imperial duties parliament had been encumbered with and the worsening crisis in Ireland.46 
As he noted: ‘How is it possible for one Government and one Parliament to deal adequately 
with all these matters and at the same time perform the functions as the great central organs 
of Government of the Empire?’47  Facing such challenges, the power, prestige and stability of 
the UK state was clearly considered by Chamberlain to be in considerable danger.  
Indeed, to underline the urgency of the situation, Chamberlain even raised the spectre 
of the collapse of the central state itself, warning of the threat of a communistic revolution if 
the problem of parliamentary congestion was not resolved (this, of course, being in the 
aftermath of the Russian revolution and during a period of organisational and electoral 
advance for the Labour Party):48 
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When parliamentary institutions break down, whether from lack of authority or from 
overwork, Bolshevism has its opportunity. Unless means can be found to devolve a 
part of its responsibilities on other bodies, and to set the Imperial Parliament free for 
the work which it alone can do, I think we shall be in grave danger of revolution 
before many years are passed.49  
Under pressure from both communities in Ireland, Government and Parliament were 
both, Chamberlain feared, at risk of collapse under the increasing weight of their domestic 
and imperial workloads.50  On a number of fronts it seemed that the centre51 was in crisis and 
while Ireland provided a strong stimulus for action, so, too, did parliamentary congestion, as 
Chamberlain highlights in the conclusion to his memorandum, 
The conclusions to which I invite the assent of the Cabinet are therefore -  
1. That the attempt to solve the Irish question in isolation has always failed and is 
doomed to failure. 
2. That the problem of decentralisation is no longer an Irish problem only, but that 
such decentralisation would be required by Great Britain even if there was no 
Irish question52 
Chamberlain’s memorandum, as was the case with a memorandum presented to the 
cabinet a month earlier by his colleague, Walter Long,53 served as a reminder that if 
procrastination by the centre was ‘no longer tenable’ by 1918–19, then it was not just a 
consequence of the crisis in Ireland.  The crisis in parliament was also a serious driver of 
political reform. Indeed, writing originally in 1926, the American-based academic, Wan-
Hsuan Chiao, went as far as to argue that the case for devolution in the United Kingdom 
‘rests upon the congestion of the House of Commons’.54 This verdict chimed with the 
observations of other contemporary commentators, such as Professor Frederic Ogg in The 
Governments of Europe (1924)55 and Ralston Hayden, in an article in the American Political 
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Science Review in 1920.56  In the House of Lords and, more importantly, the House of 
Commons, the spring and summer of 1919 would see two debates that highlighted the 
centrality of parliamentary congestion to the case for federal devolution. 
The first of these debates took place in the Lords on 5 March 1919, on the following 
resolution: 
That for the purpose of (a) securing prompt and efficient handling of pressing 
domestic problems and better control over public expenditure, and (b) enabling the 
Imperial Parliament to devote more attention to the general interests of the United 
Kingdom and matters of common Imperial concern than is possible under the present 
system of a single Parliament and Cabinet, the establishment of local legislatures 
throughout the United Kingdom is an urgent necessity.57  
It is scarcely surprising, in view of the correspondence mentioned earlier, that Lord Brassey’s 
speech, in moving this resolution, was dominated by the subject of parliamentary congestion. 
While acknowledging that parliamentary overload was ‘a very old theme’ in British politics, 
he argued that the current situation was not only ‘ten times more serious than it ever was 
before’, but, in terms somewhat akin to Chamberlain, that ‘under present conditions it is 
impossible for Parliament to discharge its functions as a Parliament, that democratic 
principles cannot be maintained, and that the people through their representatives cannot 
control administration, legislation, or public expenditure’.58  
For Brassey, as with Chamberlain, reform was less an ideological crusade than a 
practical response to a high-political crisis, in which parliamentary congestion appeared to 
threaten the very fabric of parliamentary government in the United Kingdom.59  Indeed, 
Brassey declared that he would not ‘for one moment advocate this policy of Devolution 
unless I sincerely and thoroughly believed that it would lead to the better control of the 
administration and better control of public expenditure’.60  Simply put, devolution was a 
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necessary reform if parliament were to retain its political influence and authority and, 
crucially, for her sovereignty to be retained.61  
   Lord Selborne, while discussing devolution as a ‘necessary and an almost essential 
step towards the realization of’ a more integrated Empire,62 similarly dedicated the 
substantive part of his speech to the sense that, as a result of parliamentary congestion, 
parliament was an institution in crisis.  Echoing the alarm expressed by Brassey, Selborne’s 
defence of devolution was based on a belief that congestion had rendered parliament a 
eunuch in matters of high politics and as an institution at the heart of the empire: 
I submit to you that Parliament is impotent to deal properly either with the domestic 
problems which confront us here in the United Kingdom, or with the problems of the 
Empire which, until a true Imperial Parliament exists, must be dealt with by the 
present Imperial Parliament.63 
Not only was parliament enfeebled as a result of congestion, but so too, in Selborne’s 
opinion, was the system of cabinet government.64  His message was clear: unless reform was 
undertaken, the consequences could be disastrous for the entire paraphernalia of 
parliamentary government in Britain.65  
In what was an otherwise poorly-attended debate (a point emphasized with what 
seems to have been particular relish by the lord chancellor in his response to Brassey’s 
motion),66 Selborne and Brassey’s concerns about parliamentary congestion were echoed by a 
number of peers, including Lords Crewe, Charnwood and Bryce67 (although Bryce, 
apparently in the belief that the resolution proposed federalism, voiced his concern at the 
imbalance that would be caused in the event of England having its own legislature).68 
Nevertheless, in the face of fierce opposition from the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, 
Brassey was left with little option but to withdraw his resolution.69  Greater success would be 
achieved by Brassey and Selborne’s colleagues in the Commons on 3–4 June 1919. 
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 On 3 June, Major Edward Wood moved the following resolution: 
That, with a view to enabling the Imperial Parliament to devote more attention to the  
general interests of the United Kingdom and, in collaboration with the other  
Governments of the Empire, to matters of common Imperial concern, this House is of  
the opinion that the time has come for the creation of subordinate Legislatures within  
the United Kingdom, and that to this end the Government, without prejudice to any  
proposals it may have to make with regard to Ireland, should forthwith appoint a  
Parliamentary body to consider and report –  
1. upon a measure of Federal Devolution applicable to England, Scotland, and 
Ireland, defined in its general outlines by existing differences in law and 
administration between the three countries; 
2. upon the extent to which these differences are applicable to Welsh conditions and 
requirements; and 
3. upon the financial aspects and requirements of the measure.70  
While not invoking the perils of Bolshevism outlined by Chamberlain to his cabinet 
colleagues, Wood shared a similar assessment of the urgency of reform and the dangers of 
continued inaction in the face of creaking and overburdened parliamentary machinery.71  In 
particular, Wood’s speech was a reminder of the linkages between parliamentary congestion 
and concerns about Britain’s role within the Empire, particularly in the aftermath of the 
war.72 Indeed, Wood warned his fellow MPs of the mounting pressure on parliament’s 
resources from developments in the dominions and colonies and drew attention to the 
relationship between parliamentary congestion and the Empire. Warning that the Commons 
would soon be faced with key questions of domestic and imperial concern, ‘questions of 
defence, questions of trade, of naturalisation, of land settlement’,73 Wood claimed that unless 
MPs seized the day and reduced the congestion of business, parliament risked the ignominy 
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of isolation as her dominions ‘proceed on the business without us, and the work is conducted 
independently of us’.74  
In a similar vein, Murray Macdonald, a long-standing supporter of federal devolution, 
argued that devolution was a necessary response to the growing social, industrial and imperial 
demands that had added for ‘nearly one hundred years, with constantly accumulating power 
and effect, to the mass and the volume of business of Parliament’.75  Indeed, to underline 
further the role of federal devolution as a reform aimed at enhancing parliament’s influence 
and institutional capacity, Macdonald stressed that parliamentary sovereignty would be in no 
way diminished, insisting, instead, that ‘the change which the motion proposes would not 
have this effect at all’.76   
Given his conversion to the federal devolution cause, it was unsurprising that Walter 
Long spoke in favour of the principle of reform. However, this support was qualified by 
opposition to aspects of the motion’s wording, in particular the references to national 
devolution.77  Federal devolution, he asserted, was essential in order to revive the key 
institutions of the central state and ensuring her continued leadership of the Empire.78 No MP, 
Long claimed, had yet denied that the status quo was no longer working sufficiently for the 
United Kingdom and while claiming that his conversion to reform had been reluctant, borne 
out of necessity, he stressed the urgency of reforming a form of parliamentary government 
that was no longer fit for the demands of domestic and imperial governance in the 20th 
century.79  
The case for federal devolution, as elaborated by Wood, Macdonald and Long, was, 
therefore, not for a transformative change to the British constitution; rather it was for reform 
that would conserve the centre’s significance. The argument in the eyes of these advocates 
was straightforward: for parliament to ensure its continued status as a powerful and 
prestigious institution at the heart of the Empire, it must accept the realities of political life 
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(i.e., parliamentary congestion) and the need for reform.80  This was a sentiment that would 
go on to command a dominant role during the two-day debate on the subordinate legislatures 
resolution, and while the debate could not completely divorce itself from Ireland, and though 
figures such as Henry Craik (a Scottish Unionist MP representing the combined Scottish 
universities constituency) voiced their dissent,81 there can be little doubt as to the pre-
eminence of parliamentary congestion in the debate.  At the end of this two-day debate, the 
Commons voted, by a majority of 187 to 34, in favour of Wood’s resolution.82 The stage was 
now set for the Conference on Devolution.   
4. The Conference on Devolution, 1919–20 
Following the successful subordinate legislatures resolution in the Commons on 4 June 1919, 
the coalition government, in response to a written question from Murray Macdonald, affirmed 
its intention to establish a commission on federal devolution.83  Later that summer, the 
government, again in response to a written question, announced, on 4 August, that the 
Speaker of the Commons, James Lowther, had consented to chair the inquiry.84  In October, 
the government announced the membership of the Conference on Devolution and its terms of 
reference.85 Comprising 33 members, 16 from each house of parliament and with Lowther in 
the chair, the conference was given the following remit: 
To consider and report upon a scheme of Legislative and Administrative Devolution 
within the United Kingdom having regard to – 
1) The need of reserving to the Imperial parliament the exclusive consideration of- 
a) Foreign and Imperial Affairs; and 
b) Subjects affecting the United Kingdom as a whole. 
2) The allocation of financial powers as between the Imperial Parliament and the 
subordinate legislatures, special consideration being given to the need of 
providing for the effective administration of the allocated powers. 
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3) The special needs and characteristics of the component portions of the United 
Kingdom in which subordinate legislatures are set up.86 
Following the announcement of the membership and terms of reference, the 
Conference on Devolution met on 23 October 1919.  In the first of its 32 sittings, the 
members outlined the procedure of future meetings, with sessions scheduled for 11 am to 1 
pm on Tuesdays and Thursdays.87  As the Speaker’s letter to the prime minister highlighted, 
the first topic which ‘engaged the attention of the Conference was the question as to what 
ought to be the units of area to which a scheme of devolution should apply’;88 in essence, 
whether devolution should proceed along national and/or regional lines.  
5. The Units of Devolution: National or Regional Devolution for the United Kingdom 
According to both Lowther and Gorell, it did not take much time for the conference to agree 
that Scotland and Wales should be represented via national legislatures.89  Indeed, according 
to Gorell, by only the third session, members were ‘more or less agreed as to Scotland and 
Wales each having their own Parliaments’.90   
England’s representation, however, proved to be a far more contentious issue. 
This was apparent from the very outset of the conference’s discussions on the areas to be 
represented by devolution.  As Lord Gladstone’s notes from the second sitting on 28 October 
detail, this session saw Brassey and Macdonald make the case for the principle that the ‘units 
of area should be based on nationality’ for England, Scotland and Wales, only to be faced by 
opposition from Ulster Unionist members of the conference.91  Ronald McNeill argued 
instead, that no legislative unit ‘should be larger than others in combination’92 and, according 
to Gorell, ‘spoke for an hour’, insisting that such legislatures should be based around the 
principle of economic resource equality.93  
Neither of these arguments was particularly subtle. The first was a clear attempt to 
prevent the establishment of a national legislature for England (an attempt repeated by 
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McNeill and his colleagues in the following sitting on 30 October), while the second was a 
similarly transparent bid for a model of pan-UK regional devolution that would make 
provincial government for Ulster the norm, rather than an exception. As Gorell commented in 
his diary: ‘his [McNeill’s] real motive was to smooth the way for Ulster’.94   
 However, the problems facing the conference with regard to England were not simply 
a by-product of Ulster Unionist machinations.  As it constituted the overwhelming proportion 
of the United Kingdom’s population, even before the partition of Ireland, the question of how 
England would assimilate into a system of federal devolution had been a vexatious one for 
advocates of reform long before the conference began its work.95  England’s dominance, it 
was feared, would result in tensions between an English parliament and Westminster, and at 
times of intergovernmental conflict could result in a dangerous tussle between the English 
and imperial parliaments. Churchill’s memorandum on devolution to the 1911 Home Rule 
cabinet committee, had warned that ‘two such bodies [an English parliament and the imperial 
parliament at Westminster] could not exist side by side. The English Parliament would be too 
strong.’96  
It is little wonder, then, that as The Times reflected on 29 October 1919, ‘there was 
bound to be a considerable difference of opinion as to whether England should form one area 
or several’.97  Nor should it be surprising that these difficulties continued to dog the 
conference in the sessions that followed. The question of England monopolised the sittings on 
28 October, 4 and 6 November. To quote Lowther’s letter to the prime minister, 
‘considerable doubt arose’ during these sessions on the question of how England should be 
resolved. 98  As a result, the conference was left with little choice at its fifth meeting on 6 
November, but to postpone discussions on the subject in favour of ‘an examination of the 
powers which might appear suitable to be devolved’.99    
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6. Dividing the Estate: The Conference’s Deliberations on the Powers of the Devolved 
Legislatures 
These deliberations on the powers that might be devolved to the legislatures (whomever they 
might represent or however they might be composed) are generally considered to be the 
success story of the Conference on Devolution. John Kendle, for example, has described the 
conference’s agreement of a schedule of powers as an ‘impressive achievement’ that 
represented an ‘interlude of agreement’ in the conference’s otherwise fraught proceedings.100 
Indeed, this was an image that the Speaker himself was keen to convey. Not only did he 
describe the conference in his report as having been ‘substantially agreed upon’ the subject of 
powers,101 but in private he was similarly, if not even more, effusive. In a private and 
confidential letter to Andrew Bonar Law on 18 December, he went as far as to claim that on 
this topic there had been ‘practical unanimity’ among the conference’s membership.102  
Media reports of the conference echoed Lowther’s claim of consensus. Commenting 
on the publication of the report, The Times noted that the members of the conference were ‘at 
one as to the various powers to be devolved on each legislature, to be exclusively reserved to 
the UK parliament, and to be exercised partly by one body and partly by the other’.103 In its 
summary of the conference report, the Daily Mirror similarly reported that ‘the areas which 
local legislatures should administer – viz., England, Scotland and Wales (including 
Monmouthshire) – are one of the points on which the conference was agreed’.104  
This image of harmony was repeated years after the conference finished its work. In 
his memoirs, published in 1925, Lowther reiterated his claim that on the question of 
‘administrative powers’, the conference achieved ‘far greater unanimity [than on composition 
and areas to be administered] and in five sittings we have completed satisfactorily lists of 
topics which might fairly be administered by subordinate bodies’.105  On paper at least, there 
appears good reason for Lowther to have depicted the conference’s deliberations in this area 
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as relatively harmonious.106 Certainly, the report highlighted the ‘practical unanimity’ on the 
subject of powers, with both the rival Lowther and Macdonald devolution schemes (as will be 
elaborated later in this article) endorsing the allocation of powers laid out in an appendix.107  
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence which does call into question Lowther’s 
claim to consensus on the subject of powers, evidence from one of his closest colleagues. 
While both Lowther and Macdonald believed in the importance of parliamentary sovereignty, 
they differed considerably in their vision of how this should coexist with a scheme of 
devolution.  Indeed, it is worth noting that Lowther’s memoirs referred to agreement on the 
devolution of administrative rather than legislative powers.108  While this might have been a 
straightforward failure of memory (Lowther’s memoirs were written five years after the 
publication of the report), it is, arguably, symptomatic of his minimalist approach to 
devolution, an attitude evident throughout the briefing papers and memoranda prepared for 
him by the conference’s secretary, an assistant clerk in the House of Commons, Sir Gilbert 
Campion.109   
A dominant theme throughout Campion’s papers was a sense of discomfort and, 
indeed, opposition to the idea that national and local issues could be easily separated. They 
repeatedly warned of the difficulty of dividing central and local issues, asserting that ‘the 
interconnection is so close that it might easily arise that the two kinds of parliament and 
government would have to interfere with each other’s policy’.110  In addition, Campion drew 
on examples from the Empire, namely Canada and Australia, to warn that in those dominions 
where ‘such a line [between central and local issues] exists … borderline cases are numerous 
enough to give the Courts plenty of work’.111 
Campion’s memoranda can be seen as pouring cold water on the prospects of a clear 
division between central and local subjects, despite the fact that Lowther, whose devolution 
proposal was designed by Campion, endorsed the very same schedule of powers as Murray 
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Macdonald. This was not necessarily a contradictory position, however. Rather, Lowther and 
Campion could maintain their scepticism about the desirability and possibility of a clear 
separation of central and local issues, while endorsing the very same schedule of powers as 
Macdonald, because of the intra-parliamentary nature of reform they proposed.112  
Nevertheless, while these memoranda may not have contradicted Lowther’s commitment to 
the schedule of powers, they provide a notable challenge to the apparent orthodoxy that at 
least on the question of the powers to be devolved, the conference achieved consensus. 
Ultimately, they reveal that while a consensus on powers may have existed on paper, it 
certainly did not exist in practice.113  
7. A Return to the Units of Devolution: The English Question Answered? 
While these tensions bubbled under the surface, the conference, apparently in agreement on 
the subject of powers, returned to the question of England’s role in a devolved United 
Kingdom.  According to Lowther’s letter to the prime minister, the conference’s deliberations 
on powers had served to clarify matters in favour of national devolution for England, with 
regionalisation considered to ‘present such formidable administrative difficulties that … 
ought not to form a feature of such a system in its initial stage’.114 As with the question of 
powers, there, again, appears to be good reason to believe that the conference managed to 
come to a swift resolution following the resumption of their deliberations on the English 
question in December 1919. Indeed, by this time both the pro-devolutionist and more 
conservative wings of the conference membership appear to have been working on the 
assumption that England would be retained as a singular unit.  
Not only did Viscount Gladstone present a working paper for his devolutionist 
colleagues on 11 December entitled ‘On the Assumption that England is undivided’,115 but 
around the same time the embryonic stages of the Speaker’s intra-parliamentary devolution 
proposals were presented to the conference.116 The precise details of the Speaker’s proposals 
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will be discussed shortly, but crucially for this discussion, they envisaged a singular form of 
representation for England.117  This state of affairs had been confirmed by Lowther in his 
letter to Bonar Law on 18 September 1919, in which he described the conference as having 
moved to a discussion of two differing proposals for devolution, both of which retained 
England as a single unit.118  
However, although this suggests that the issue of England’s representation had been 
resolved by Christmas 1919, there is, again, evidence to suggest that such was far from the 
case. As with the schedule of powers, tensions (and indeed anxiety) simmered under the 
surface. Even Gladstone, who authored a memorandum based on the assumption that England 
would be undivided, was conflicted and even hesitant on the question of an all-England 
institution.  Despite dismissing fears about an English national institution as mistaken,119 he 
admitted a certain degree of reluctance and concern: ‘if forced to choose [between the 
subdivision of England or a singular legislature]-singular-yet [I] do see the danger’.120    
Furthermore, as with the case of the schedule of powers, while Lowther and 
Macdonald both endorsed the principle of England being represented by a singular 
institution, they differed considerably on the question of how this would look in practice. 
Campion’s papers, prepared for the Speaker, again demonstrate this difference of opinion and 
the way in which England became another means with which to critique Macdonald’s 
devolution proposals; indeed, they warned that England’s predominance within the United 
Kingdom would result in friction between an English legislature and the central parliament 
that would leave the latter a diminished body.121  Again, this is not a contradictory position, 
rather a reflection of the differing nature of the intra-parliamentary devolution envisaged by 
the Speaker and the scheme proposed by Murray Macdonald. It is to the conference’s 
deliberations on these proposals that this article will now turn. 
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8. Keeping it in the Family? The Composition of Devolution and the Relationship between 
Subordinate Legislatures and Whitehall 
Two differing schemes of devolution were put before the conference; schemes that, while 
offering the same powers and fiscal responsibilities and national representation for England, 
Scotland and Wales, diverged on the question of how these bodies should be constituted.  The 
inability of the conference to bridge this difference would prove fatal.  
The first scheme, belonging to Speaker Lowther, was brought to the attention of the 
conference in December 1919.  His proposal was for a measure of intra-parliamentary (at 
least initially) devolution inspired by the grand committee system within the House of 
Commons: 
We have in the Scottish Standing Committee, of which the House of Commons has 
had considerable experience, the germ of a system which could be extended and 
strengthened. The Scottish Standing Committee, enshrined in our Standing Orders for 
the last thirty years, is the first step towards devolution and sets out the direction 
which we might well follow.122  
However, while inspired by the grand committee system, Lowther’s proposals 
differed in the sense that these bodies – he titled them ‘Grand Councils’ – would be 
bicameral. The lower chamber, or ‘The Council of Commons’, would consist, for England, 
Scotland and Wales, of the MPs elected from constituencies in those respective nations, while 
the upper chamber, ‘The Council of Peers’, would be composed of a number of peers equal to 
half the number of MPs returned from each nation, chosen by the committee of selection of 
the house of lords.123  Sessions of these Grand Councils would take place during the autumn 
months, while spring and summer would be reserved for ‘the ordinary session’ of 
parliament.124 
Among the strengths Lowther claimed for his scheme were the following:  
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1) The continuity of the parliamentary system and the preservation of parliamentary 
traditions. In Lowther’s opinion, outlined in his December 1919 memorandum, it 
would seem ‘extremely desirable’ for any scheme of devolution to maintain the 
‘spirit and ancient traditions of Westminster’. Particularly as these bodies would 
be charged with work which had hitherto been conducted within Westminster. By 
devolving power within Westminster,125 these parliamentary traditions and 
experience would be safeguarded, rather than discarded. 
2) Subordination of the new authorities. As creatures of Westminster, firmly rooted 
within parliament, these new bodies would not endanger parliamentary 
sovereignty in the manner that might be possible through separate and directly 
elected legislatures.  
3) Economy of administration. Lowther contended that, as parliamentary bodies, his 
new institutions would avoid the additional expenditure brought about by the 
creation of separate legislatures; for example, the cost of elections to these bodies. 
4) The tentative nature of his proposals. Lowther’s scheme was marketed to his 
fellow conference members as a ‘transitional’ proposal, with the Grand Councils 
initially established for a period of five years. During the first three years of their 
existence, these bodies would purely be focused on exercising the powers and 
responsibilities devolved upon them, while in the final two years the Grand 
Councils would also sit in joint sittings as a ‘constituent council’ tasked with 
submitting to parliament schemes for the future of devolution. Namely, whether to 
replace themselves with a directly elected legislature, to continue as presently 
constituted, or ‘to revert to the status quo ante’.126 This settlement, Lowther 
argued, would enable the respective nations of the UK (or rather their 
parliamentary representatives) to decide the model of devolution that best served 
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their particular demands. As he noted, ‘a suit of one cut will not necessarily fit 
three different individuals’.127 
While aware that his scheme would not delight all members of the conference, 
Lowther warned (as it turned out prophetically) of the fate that would await a divided 
conference: ‘if the labours of our Conference should end in a sharp division of opinion, or in 
several reports being presented, our labours will probably have been in vain’.128  His plan, 
because of its transitional nature, was thus cast as offering sufficient flexibility that 
conference members of all persuasions, from devolutionist to devo-sceptic, could find some 
point upon which they could agree. For sceptics it could be abandoned after one term, and for 
devolutionists it offered a means of achieving directly-elected legislatures.129 
Despite this ‘best of both worlds’ appeal, Lowther’s plan was greeted with opposition 
and even incredulity from devolutionists. Lord Gorell, for example, was scathing in his 
assessment of the proposals, describing them as ‘a perfectly drivelling suggestion quite at 
variance with the elementary principle of real devolution’.130  Gladstone was similarly 
opposed, noting not only that under Lowther’s proposals the ‘confusion of issues [between 
domestic and imperial affairs] becomes more confounded’, but that it would actually add to 
the workload of parliamentarians and, as a result of its intra-parliamentary nature, would 
exclude ‘many classes of persons excellently qualified to take part in local business’.131  
Devolutionist opposition to Lowther, however, would be marshalled most 
prominently by Murray Macdonald.  His first shots across Lowther’s bow were fired in a 
memorandum presented to the conference in February 1920.132  While paying tribute to the 
Speaker as ‘one of the great figures of our parliamentary life’,133 Macdonald not only queried 
the claimed advantage of preserving parliamentary tradition enshrined in the Speaker’s 
scheme,134 but more problematically, given the importance of parliamentary congestion in 
establishing the conference, claimed that Lowther’s plan would increase pressures on the 
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parliamentary timetable.135 According to calculations based on the parliamentary sessions of 
1904–5 and 1907–8, Macdonald claimed that Lowther’s scheme would leave the UK 
government with only a small number of days for ‘measures of UK legislation introduced by 
the Government and for emergencies’ and, while he acknowledged that there were ‘no means 
of estimating’ how Grand Council sessions would balance out, he used the time spent in 
parliament on the 1902 and 1906 Education Bills and the 1904 and 1908 Licensing Bills, to 
claim that an English Grand Council would struggle to do its work in the time envisaged by 
the Speaker’s plan.136 
 Macdonald’s alternative proposal was for directly-elected legislatures in England, 
Scotland and Wales. In each nation, these legislatures would be unicameral137 and the size of 
each chamber would reflect the number of MPs elected from England, Scotland, and Wales, 
respectively, with members elected from the same constituencies used for Westminster 
elections. Members of the House of Lords would be eligible for election to these bodies 
which would sit for five years unless dissolved earlier.138 This was a proposal, Macdonald 
claimed, that offered the ‘only possible scheme of devolution’ which could provide an 
effective relief of congestion within parliament, strengthen democratic accountability of 
politicians, provide effective control of new subordinate bodies over their executives and 
avoid ‘that hopeless confusion’ of political issues and responsibilities that he believed was 
inherent in Lowther’s proposals.139  
 As Lowther’s plan was heavily criticized by the devolutionist faction within the 
Conference on Devolution, so, too, were Macdonald’s proposals by the more sceptical 
members of the conference.  In a memorandum prepared for the Speaker, Sir Gilbert 
Campion outlined three major disadvantages of Macdonald’s scheme: first, the multiplicity of 
elections; second, the danger posed to parliament through the loss of popular interest and 
rivalry of an English parliament, and finally, expense. On the first charge, Campion noted 
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that Macdonald’s scheme would result in voters having to vote in at least two general 
elections (one for Westminster and one for the respective devolved legislature) at least twice 
every five years ‘and probably oftener’.  Such a state of affairs, he claimed, would greatly 
increase inconvenience for voters and risked electoral fatigue that could result in ‘a tendency 
either for both central and local bodies to be returned by a low percentage of votes, or, more 
probably, that the electors would concentrate interest in one of the bodies, and be apathetic 
towards the other’.140 
 This latter possibility touches on the second disadvantage outlined by Campion, that 
of a risk to the reputation of Westminster.  Campion feared that in circumstances of electoral 
fatigue, the House of Commons ‘would be more likely to suffer in this respect than the local 
Parliaments’, a reflection that the local parliaments would be charged with business of more 
everyday concern that that charged to Westminster after devolution.141  The situation would 
be worse, Campion argued, in the case of an English parliament.  According to Campion, an 
English parliament would, especially at times of international peace, represent a more 
superior attraction than Westminster for both voters and politicians, resulting in the central 
parliament becoming a rapidly-diminished body and potentially manned by politicians of an 
increasingly inferior standard.142 Parliamentary sovereignty, he feared, would be further 
challenged at times of intergovernmental conflict, with an English parliament representing 
four-fifths of the United Kingdom’s total population and wealth. 
On the final charge of expense, Campion claimed that Macdonald’s plan would result 
in total expenditure (including salaries of local members, provision and maintenance of new 
buildings and salaries of ministers and civil servants) in the region of some ‘six to ten 
millions and an annual charge of nearly a million’.  While he acknowledged that some of this 
expense was unavoidable under any scheme of devolution, he noted that a proposal that 
mitigated these costs [i.e., the Speaker’s] would ‘appear at any rate prima facie preferable’.143    
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A number of Campion’s objections were shared by other figures within the 
conference. Lord Southborough, for example, echoed Campion’s concern about the 
multiplicity of elections, suggesting that this would result in ‘almost continuous party 
warfare’ as parties were forced to increase their activities to cope with an expansion in the 
number of elections fought across Great Britain.144  He similarly echoed Campion’s fears 
about the dignity of Westminster in the event of directly-elected subordinate legislatures, 
claiming that ‘there is a grave danger that the latter [Westminster] may be obscured by the 
former [local legislatures] and sink into comparative insignificance or even contempt’.145   
Again, as with Campion’s memorandum, Southborough considered this to be particularly 
problematic with regard to an English parliament; an institution that he also feared could 
‘easily be brought into collision’ with Westminster, resulting in an ‘extremely dangerous 
situation’ developing.146  These arguments were also repeated by Ronald McNeill, whose 
memorandum not only dismissed Macdonald’s ‘optimistic view’ that an English parliament 
would pose no threat of rivalry to Westminster,147 but rehearsed the previous argument that, 
outside of times of national emergency or international crisis, Westminster would slide into 
popular insignificance vis-à-vis the proceedings of the local legislatures.148 
Facing these two fundamentally divergent schemes of devolution, the conference 
concluded its proceedings in April 1920 in the ‘sharp division of opinion’ that the Speaker 
had warned of in December 1919.149  Thirteen members apiece supported the Speaker and 
Macdonald’s plans, while five members (Lord Aberdare, Henry Cowan, Charles Edwards, J. 
Hugh Edwards, and W. Tyson Wilson) gave their backing to both schemes, stating their 
readiness to accept the Speaker’s proposal as providing an ‘immediate prospect for securing a 
considerable measure of Devolution on National lines’.150  Facing this stalemate, the Speaker 
could claim little more than that the conference had ‘thrown new light upon the problem [of 
devolution]’.151 While The Times152 and a bloc of devolutionists led by Murray Macdonald 
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sought to keep the issue alive, the conference report and the issue of federal devolution 
slipped swiftly into the footnote status which it has enjoyed to the current day.  
9. Conclusion 
This article has explored one of the more obscure moments in the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional history, the Conference on Devolution 1919–20, asking why this event 
happened and examining the content of its deliberations.  It has challenged the Irish-centric 
historiography of the Conference on Devolution and federal devolution in this period, 
demonstrating, instead, that parliamentary congestion was the pre-eminent reason why MPs 
voted for the establishment of the conference.  
The more substantive contribution, however, comes in the assessment of the 
conference’s proceedings. While the fact that the conference concluded in stalemate is not an 
original finding, this article has shed new light in one area of the proceedings which has, 
hitherto, been presumed to have been thoroughly uncontroversial: the powers of the devolved 
legislatures. The schedule of powers agreed by the conference was hailed by Lowther as a 
moment of ‘practical unanimity’ and described by Kendle as an ‘interlude of agreement’ 
amid the otherwise fraught proceedings of the conference. As this article has demonstrated, 
while consensus on paper may have existed, it certainly did not in practice.  The Conference 
on Devolution may be considered little more than a footnote in history today, but there is 
much more to learn about this rare moment in British constitutional history when territorial 
governance was approached in the round, particularly at a time when a UK constitutional 
convention has been brought onto the political agenda. 
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